Is Mike Ashley The New Blackadder?

Many of us watched the goings on at the Sports Direct AGM yesterday open-mouthed at the level of drama being acted out both on and off the stage.

Shareholder revolts are nothing new, and Ashley and Keith Hellawell surely had it coming, especially as it emerged recently that Hellawell had attempted to dodge the bullet of criticism by tendering his resignation before the company published its damning review into working practices.

One of the major criticisms being lobbed at Mike Ashley is the treatment his staff have to endure as a result of regular end of shift searches.  So it was doubly ironic that yesterday he suffered the same ignominy under the full glare of the cameras.

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One wonders if the inclusion of a huge wad of fifty pound notes in his trouser pocket was a deliberate attempt at bravado.  The search came as part of a tour of the warehouse facilities Ashley was leading, presumably as part of an attempt to show improved working practices. He must have known it was going to happen, so the appearance of that crisp wedge of cash would have been unavoidable.  Or perhaps he’s just so loaded he forgot about that bit of loose change in his trousers.  If that’s the case perhaps he should be renamed Blackadder after this scene from the show.

What it says about Ashley rather belies the impression I got of him at the recent Parliamentary inquiry he attended.  I wrote the column below for Retail Week last Month, but after yesterday’s performance I think I may have to revise my assessment.

He may still like to consider my suggestions for improvements in working conditions though, even though they may rob him of future chances to whip his wad out when he needs to make an entrance.

I stand by my judgement on Philip Green however, who seems to get more loathsome by the day.  As an ambassador for all that’s great about retail success, he’s about as welcome as a turd in a swimming pool.  Even if that swimming pool is on board a 100 million pound penis extension.  The recent ‘renaming’ of his fabulous yacht by comedian Lee Nelson rather summed up my feelings and probably those of the thousands of BHS staff and pension holders he’s helped to leave in dry dock

https://twitter.com/RealLeeNelson/status/773227818075492352

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My Column from Retail Week 11th August

Watching the recent Parliamentary appearances of Mike Ashley and Sir Philip Green, I was surprised to find myself warming slightly to Mr Ashley, something I’d never have imagined possible a few months ago.

That said it was rather like deciding which dastardly stage villain you’d most like to share a stage with, or perhaps a better analogy would be the pantomime horse.

In Green’s case he came across as arrogant and resentful.  Quite obviously certain in his belief that he was better than every person in the chamber.

It was a performance of bravado and bluster that, if I had my psychologist’s hat on, I’d say was more over-compensation than real attitude.  But then considering he apparently needs one yacht for himself and several others for his ego, I might be giving him a far too sympathetic analysis.

In both cases it’s apparent that they were less concerned about how their behaviour reflected on their own companies than they perhaps should be.  A blasé attitude that their customers will remain loyal to their brands, regardless of their attitude to the usual social mores that constrain the rest of us.

Ratner Moment

They may be right, but I wonder how far we’ve really moved on from the days when a mis-timed joke can bring down a company, as we saw with Gerald Ratner 25 years ago (yes it really has been that long!).  There but for the grace of the god of retail goes any of us.

With that in mind I remain baffled over Sir Phil’s nonchalance at being photographed relaxing on the deck of his third multi-million pound status symbol, while BHS sinks slowly to the bottom with the loss of almost all hands.  As Gerald discovered to his cost, timing is everything.

Mike Ashley at least looked like he was taking the questions being asked seriously though.  Considering he reportedly had to be dragged to Parliament ‘kicking and screaming’ he seemed to warm to the experience remarkably well.

His main defence against the revelations of questionable staff treatment at his distribution warehouses was ignorance of the circumstances and practices going on inside his own company.

I’m not going to speculate about the veracity of that claim, but as in many walks of life, as with MPs, doctors, military leaders, and business owners, the fault ultimately lies with the person at the top.  They set the tone and decide the ethos and culture of the organisation.  It’s really not a defence to say ‘Not me guv!’.

The culture in Sports Direct seems to be one of expediency and antipathy.  A strata of mistrust that runs through the company from the warehouse and shop floor staff upwards.  A belief that everyone is out to get everyone else.

Ashley expressed dismay that the daily searches of warehouse staff were taking longer than they did when he set them up 10 years earlier.  But in that admission he confirms that the general tone of the relationship between staff and management remains one of distrust.

Trust

Perhaps he’s right to feel that way, but that does beg the question as to why they would employ staff that they did not have absolute faith in.  Perhaps past experience informed their actions and the belief that they would be robbed blind if they didn’t watch everyone like a hawk.

To me that lack of trust seems to be at the heart of the problems at Sports Direct.  Sadly, rather than dealing with that, Ashley has pushed to improve the searching procedures to reduce the ‘bottlenecks’ at the end of shifts.

But another approach would have been to foster more loyalty in his workforce so that they might be less inclined to help themselves to a five-fingered bonus in the first place.

The culture in Sports Direct seems to be one of expediency and antipathy.  A strata of mistrust that runs through the company from the warehouse and shop floor staff upwards.  A belief that everyone is out to get everyone else.

Studies carried out many years ago showed an inverse relationship between company culture, pay levels, job security and the problem of pilfering.  In my own company, selling many easily pocketable items of high value, we never resorted to body searches.  I did consider them on occasions, but felt that the damage they would do to morale and staff relationships weren’t worth the small amounts that we undoubtedly lost over the years.

And with stringent stock control procedures in place, and – most importantly – seen to be in place, we knew the losses were minimal, even though on one occasion we had to have the manager and all the staff in a branch arrested over cash handling irregularities.

The key for me was that we had a good relationship with our staff and there was mutual trust and respect.  I’m firmly convinced that prevented just as much shrinkage as any number of cavity searches, body scanners and security staff.

So as Mike Ashley starts to get to grips with the managerial problems within a company that he admits may have outgrown previous internal audit procedures, he could perhaps do worse than take a look down the other end of the telescope.  Put himself in the place of his workforce who, if recent reports are to be believed, feel undervalued, under-paid and under suspicion.

A more open and meritocratic attitude towards HR management has so often been cited as the root of success in many companies, most notably in the IT sector.  Likewise success in retail doesn’t have to come down to the hard nosed antisympathetic treatment of those who work for you and with you.

Moreover, in terms of customer facing businesses like ours, we certainly don’t need our leading lights to be seen in the media as disconnected, uncaring profiteers.  Or to be dubbed by the press as “Rude, unprofessional and bad-tempered”.

Indeed as we’re finding out now, in a supposedly more enlightened and informed world, such behaviour could not only be counter-productive, it may even lead to another ‘Ratner moment’ in the very near future.

BHS – The ‘Dead Store Walking’ That Never Really Had a Chance

I greeted the news of the sale of BHS to Retail Acquisitions with the same feeling of incredulity I’d previously experienced over Gordon Brother’s purchase of the ailing Blockbuster chain in 2013.

It seemed like a crazy buy, not least because if a canny businessman like Philip Green wants to shake hands on the sale of a major company for £1, you’d better count your fingers carefully afterwards.

The CVA details, released last month, revealed just how crazy it was. With a massive pension fund hole, debts of around £1.3bn and ongoing trading losses, it was going to take a miracle of biblical proportions to rescue the company for even the most experienced retail turnaround specialist. For someone like Dominic Chappell – a retail novice with several failed companies and a personal bankruptcy behind him – it was totally doolally.

The other thing that bothered me was the name of the company – Retail Acquisitions – which suggests that its primary aim was to acquire the stores, rather than to actually run them.

BHS was a dead store walking and I suspect Sir Green knew that when he sold it. Even the previously over-optimistic Gordon Brothers refused to sanction a £60m loan to Chappell for BHS, which if nothing else at least shows that they did their sums properly this time before leaping head first into another obviously doomed turnaround fiasco.

Dodging the Bullet

There are very few upsides to any of this, but I can’t help thinking how much worse things could have been had Philip Green also managed to buy M&S back in 2004. Already 4 years into his stewardship of BHS by then, one can only wonder if both these venerable old stores would have ended up in the mincer.

M&S still has it’s problems, but it’s taken a far more robust route towards re-inventing itself than was ever evident at BHS. Updated, more up-market branding, a re-positioned clothing offer and a far more efficient front of house has kept Marks and Sparks out of the clutches of the receiver. Above all though it seems that dodging the bullet of being added to the Green portfolio was a far greater benefit to it’s survival.

The tired, confused and cluttered shop floor that greets you in BHS these days screams underinvestment and shredded staff morale. It’s been clear for years that Sir Phil had no idea what to do with BHS. In it’s final days under his stewardship, it was stuffed with poorly executed Arcadia brand concessions making it even less likely that shoppers would cross the threshold.

Essentially there was little inside that wasn’t already available elsewhere. This would also prove to be an Achilles heel for the new owners, leaving them very little room for manoeuvre in re-inventing the stock offer to attract new customers.

A late-to-the-party, rather shonky website did nothing to lift the image of a brand that was already years past it’s sell by date by the time it hit the net. The last gasp flirtation with a food offer shortly before selling the chain suggests the company had finally resorted to plagiarism of the more successful sectors of the M&S operation in a half-hearted attempt to turn the super-tanker before it hit the rocks.

Questions Need Answers

Given Sir Phil’s legendary retail acumen, it’s a conundrum as to why he wasn’t able to breathe new life into BHS rather than bail out. It’s almost like he wasn’t trying. Ultimately his priority was not to be on the apple cart when the wheels came off, which in business terms was a great move for him, but rather a bad one for his staff and creditors.

As shadow business secretary Angela Eagle has pointed out, there are still questions that need answers, especially if it’s it’s going to be left to the taxpayer to make up shortfalls in redundancies and pensions.

I hope in the spirit of openness and transparency recently inspired by his friend David Cameron, Sir Phil will be just as forthright about his own personal financial arrangements. I’m sure speculation that, during the 15 years of his ownership, he trousered remuneration roughly equal to the hole in the pension fund is just a random quirk of inconsequential coincidence.

Likewise, there’s also some concern about pay-outs to Retail Acquisitions that may not have been entirely appropriate in the circumstances. It’s now expected that the company will be called before MPs to explain some of its actions in the run up to the collapse.

Even if there was a plan to relaunch the brand after the buy out, it’s become apparent over recent weeks that this was secondary to re-financing the company. Something that should have been in place long before the new owners picked up the keys.

Speculation

Speculation will now be rife about the future for BHS. A pre-pack resurrection deal seems unlikely considering the complexity of the situation and the continuing dead weight of the pension fund. That would also seem to preclude the option of a buyer being found for the company as a going concern. Even so, according to the administrators, there have been numerous expressions of ‘serious interest’ from prospective buyers. But I suspect it’s the nature of that interest that will be the rub.

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I’m sure speculation that, during the 15 years of his ownership, he trousered remuneration roughly equal to the hole in the pension fund is just a random quirk of inconsequential coincidence.

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If it does shutter it’s doors, it’s likely that BHS sized hole in our high street will be more difficult to fill now than it was after the demise of Woolworths in 2008. Not just as physical space, but in terms economic and societal impact of so many job and creditor losses. The announcement a few days ago of the collapse of Austin Reed will make that even more acute.

When Woolies went down there were plenty of takers from the bargain end of the retail spectrum eager to gain extra floor space. That sector is largely saturated now, although B&M Bargains are apparently eying some of the BHS portfolio.

Dominic Chappell himself is also reported to be keen to extend his BHS pipedream by buying back the majority of the company from the administrators using yet more borrowed money, this time from the USA. This smacks to me now more of obsession than sound business sense and I can see no reason why we wouldn’t just see a re-run of the last 14 months.

Let’s hope then that reports of viable rescue plans prove to be more than the wishful thinking of the administrators, and that if any part of the company can be saved, the future owners have pockets deep enough to allow them to concentrate on the business of retail rather than of finance.

Unrealistic Rents Are Risking The Future Of Our High Streets

The British Retail Consortium warned recently that a failure to deal with our broken business rates system could have a devastating impact on our economy.

In a stark prediction to the Chancellor, they estimated that up to 80,000 shops could fall empty over the next 2 years, putting 800,000 jobs at risk.

This is based on the assumption that 60% of stores facing lease renewals over the next 2 years may simply walk away from what has become an unsustainable commercial property model in the face of climbing rents and falling sales.

I’ve previously highlighted the perfect storm that is brewing up towards the end of 2015, with 40-50% of commercial leases falling due to for renewal.

The BRC’s predictions may be pessimistic, but there’s every reason to believe that a huge dent could be put in the retail economy very soon. This is especially worrying, considering consumer spending and the associated debt shift to private borrowing is what appears to underpin much of George Osborne’s plans for our economy over the next few years. Likewise many local authorities now rely more heavily on business rates as cuts in central government funding bite even deeper.

I’ve often been critical of the BRC. I see them as an organisation geared heavily towards protecting the big boys in the retail hierarchy, with only the odd glance back down the ladder towards small independents and medium sized chains. But on this occasion I’m in complete agreement with them, although for slightly different reasons.

Rates Burden

Business rates are of course a huge burden on high street operators and an issue that urgently needs to be addressed by the Chancellor – indeed it’s something I rarely tire of saying myself. But this has been the case for at least the last 10 years now.

However all this is largely irrelevant to the overall problem. The main reason why many store leases may lapse at the end of this year has less to do with rates and more to do with the ridiculously out of kilter valuations of the properties themselves.

It’s often conveniently forgotten that business rates are based on historic rent agreements. Many of them made by companies financed by the very same people who also bankroll mall developers and institutional landlords, both of whom have a vested interest in keeping rental expectations unrealistically high.

The driving force behind our inflated rating valuations are the equally avaricious demands by landlords who would rather see a store empty than see it’s theoretical value fall.

Bluff And Deception

Anyone who has had experience of lease renewals over the last 5 or 6 years will tell you that there’s very little sign of pragmatism from landlords or property advisers. Any hopes of the market being reset after the financial crash have long been abandoned.

This is partly down to the way that commercial property has become the vehicle of choice for the disconnected behemoths that are multi-national investment funds, but mainly because most such organisations are hip-deep in the same quagmire of over-leveraged debt that led to the spectacular economic swan dive we all witnessed a few short years ago.

There has long been a fragile framework of bluff and deception underlying the retail property market. More than any other commercial property transaction, store leases and rents are teetering on the edge of an abyss created by property advisers and fund managers who simply refuse to give any quarter to such mundanities as fiscal viability or long term tenant relationships.

The general principle seems to be that as long as they can keep the music playing, no one ever has to count the empty seats. The problem now of course is that a raft of impending lease expiries means there may soon be a lot more chairs and a lot less people willing to play the game.

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The driving force behind our inflated rating valuations are the equally avaricious demands by landlords who would rather see a store empty than see it’s theoretical value fall.

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There was nothing tangible in the recent budget about business rates reform, and that’s something that we must continue to demand from a government that has been consistently phlegmatic about, despite promises of action.  But that’s now only half the story. Without effective commercial rent and lease control, or some voluntary injection of common sense into the equation, these other costs will simply expand to fill the vacuum created by any reduction in the rates bill.

If we’re going to avoid thousands more empty stores and hundreds of thousand of lost jobs, we need a comprehensive review of the entire bricks and mortar proposition. In the meantime property taxation will only be a part of any retailers decision to stay or walk away.

Phones 4U – The Winners And Losers

The announcement by Phones 4u’s administrator Price Waterhouse Coopers that it is closing 362 of the retailer’s stores permanently really is an appalling outcome for the 1697 store staff who now find themselves out of a job.

I feel very sorry for these people at the sharp end of what seems on the face of it to be a rather sordid tale. I know from speaking to some of the employees that most had absolutely no idea that their jobs were balanced on such a knife edge, and from what I understand from other reports, senior management had little inkling either.

Perhaps they should have had though. Certainly the company’s main investors could have shown a little more sensitivity to the likely outcome of negotiations with the four main carriers when they explained that they weren’t able to offer competitive terms in the face of a mountain of debt that needed to be serviced. Especially as a good deal of that debt was apparently self imposed as a result of some rather creative financial arrangements.

Equally Vodafone and EE should perhaps have considered the impression their actions would give to their own customers when they, fairly unceremoniously, pulled the rug from under a long-term business partner. Perhaps they weren’t prepared for Phones 4U management to take such drastic action. I know I was personally flabbergasted at how easily they appeared to give up the fight when the Vodafone contract had another 6 months left to run and EE’s wasn’t due to expire for a further year.

Most businesses would have kept trading and explored other possibilities, probably including some hasty re-trenching and fence mending with all the carriers. Of course I’m not privy to all the reasons for their decision to go into administration so eagerly, but it seems to me that a business with over a billion pound turnover and profits in excess of £100M might have been worth a little more effort than a press of the nuclear button without further attempts at diplomacy. I’ve certainly seen many much smaller businesses struggle to stay afloat for a lot longer than these guys.

Easy Money

Maybe that’s the problem. For those companies already staked in the game, the mobile phone business has been seen for some time as easy money. The phones and tariffs are laid on by other companies and an obliging public pitches up every time one or the other produces another subtle flavour of hardware or call package that in essence does the same thing as the last, only slightly better. These carefully stage managed increments keep the punters hooked and the cash rolling in. Perhaps when things got a little tougher than that for the board, it’s just wasn’t worth the trouble.

Now the very same carriers that precipitated this situation are reportedly picking off the juicier fruit from the P4U property cherry bowl for their own standalone stores. After an epiphany, undoubtedly born of the internet, they’ve discovered that cutting out the middle men means the money tree just grew a bit taller.

It’ll be interesting to see if tariffs are reduced accordingly now there’s one less bite out of the pie. But somehow I doubt it, especially as most of the carriers have of late been furiously re-writing their contracts in ways that haven’t been particularly advantageous to their customers. And let’s not forget that, with a reduction in competition on the high street, the consumer is going to have less opportunity shop around. As the carriers take more of a direct sales approach, the choice will be limited to service and coverage rather than tariff with fewer independent resellers to stir the pot.

I suppose grabbing the tastier morsels of the Phones 4 U portfolio is a pragmatic move, but it still looks like opportunism born of fancy footwork on their part. In the final analysis the people who have, justifiably or not, pulled the plug are now picking over the bones of a business that previously appeared to be thriving.

A Dream Outcome For Dixons Carphone

Dixons Carphone don’t come out of this smelling like roses either, even though I suppose they can’t be held accountable for the actions of their own suppliers, it does look like a superlative bit of luck on their part that shortly after announcing the closure of 160 Phones 4U concessions in their Currys stores, their main competitor loses all support from their mutual partners. I’m not suggesting there was any collusion involved, but it does seem like the kind of dream outcome that many a rival company would have to pinch themselves hard to believe.

To be fair, Dixons have offered jobs to many of the former concessions staff, which does of course also provide them with a ready made workforce. They’ve also been making efforts to acquire a number of the Phones 4U locations and have been promising jobs for the staff involved in those locations. However it’s understood that the administrators have been less than enthusiastic, so one can only speculate as to the kinds of offers Dixons Carphone are making for the properties. Dixons taking over the stores could of course safeguard of a number of jobs, but they still stand to gain a lot out of the deal themselves.

There were undoubtedly a lot of contributory circumstances leading up to this meltdown, but it still leaves a very nasty taste in my mouth and a hell of a stink under my nose. A ludicrous situation and a sad outcome that could have been avoided at so many key points. I only hope all parties concerned, including the P4U investors and management, the carriers, and Dixons Carphone are as uncomfortable about all this as I am.

Although I doubt any of us will be as uncomfortable as the store staff and their families who suddenly find themselves without an income so close to Christmas.

Let’s Not Plan Any Retail Street Parties Just Yet

For many retail and economic pundits the term ‘anal-yst’ seems very apt.  So many of them seem to talk out of their backsides that it’s rare for me to find one that I agree with in broad terms.

Jon Copestake is one such individual, and I frequently find myself in agreement with the majority of his comments in Retail Week Magazine.  His comments today – Despite optimism, a UK retail recovery remains fragile – are no exception.

Along with many others, he’s quoted the LDC and Springboard figures that show a very tiny improvement in high street vacancy rates as part of the general consensus of optimism that seems to be building.  There were equally modest positive increments in retail sales figures which, whilst being better than expected, are still in the order of 1%.

Last week we saw breathless reports that the nebulous and somewhat metaphysical indicator known as ‘consumer confidence’ had finally recovered from the negative position it had been in for 10 years.  We were presumably expected to rejoice that this number had now reached a big fat zero, all of us clapping with one hand whilst frantically grasping handfuls of straws with the other.

Having spent a small portion of my academic career designing questionnaires, I’ve never been convinced by such a slippery concept.  Quite what real use a number based on asking a select sample of people if they’re likely to spend a few quid in the coming weeks is supposed to be eludes me.  I think it’s more something that retailers and investors cling on to as a comforter, intended to give the impression that we know the unknowable – the inside of a consumer’s head.

It’s hard to ignore the conclusion that the effort we all put it to predicting doom and gloom around the time of the collapse ultimately led to a self fulfilling conclusion.  But now we seem equally eager to ‘big up’ minuscule vacancy level movements in the order of 0.5% or a 0.4% – which in statistical significance terms are pretty much static – as evidence that good times are just around the corner.

The overall assessment from many retail analysts is that we’ll never see a return to the heady days of the early noughties.   ONS figures suggest that even though wage growth has edged ahead of inflation, most households are still around 10 years behind in real terms spending power.

Even if wages do rise in real terms there are just too many other ways for people to spend money now, assuming the average person ever really gets back to a point where they’ll feel they have the cash to splash around.  Factor in an ever imminent increase in mortgage rates, along with another housing price boom and the whole scenario starts to take on the familiar twists of the path that led us to disaster last time.

There are so many artificial factors driving the so-called recovery I think it’s far too early to be planning the next major roll-outs.  Low interest rates, the property bubble being inflated by government help to buy schemes, changes in weather patterns, even mis-sold PPI payouts are all shifting winds blowing across the sands of the retail landscape.  And we all know where building on sand gets us.

Whatever the numbers are based on there seems to be a mounting roar of expectation that the bunting will be out for a great big retail street party any day now.  Something of a turnaround from the interminable reports of the exact opposite a couple of years ago.  Personally I’m far from convinced that what we’re feeling are the positive winds of change and more worried that the rush of air could just be the prelude to another almighty slap right in our over-eager little faces.

When is a U-Turn not a U-Turn? The Parallel Universe of the BRC

Last week’s sudden abandonment by the BRC of calls for a rates freeze came as something of a surprise to most of us, especially those of us who saw a freeze as a compromise anyway.

With business rates increases over the past two years adding over half a billion quid to retailers overheads bills, it didn’t seem too much to ask for government to allow us a bit of breathing space.  Even more so in the face of flatlining high street sales and the erosion of margins by other taxes such as VAT, which have already caused multiple failures this year.

A freeze was never going to be the final solution though.  The growing clamour for a complete revision of local taxation must by now be reaching even the lofty heights of the ivory towers inhabited by the Chancellor and his advisers.  Even so, it seems nothing is to be done to offer a helping hand to retailers.  The closest we’ve come to any direct action on high streets in the last 2 years was planning minister Nick Boles recent proposal that they should effectively be sold off to residential developers and forgotten about.

Now the BRC, an organisation I’d have expected much better of, has not so much blown the idea of a rates freeze out of the water, it’s sent it into orbit!

The reasons for this about-turn, according to Director General Helen Dickinson, is government claims of a potential £1Bn hole in the country’s finances.  This, she says, has led her to see the error of her ways and ally the BRC with the CBI who have been calling for a 2% cap on rates increases, rather than a freeze, for some time now, arguing that this is a more achievable goal in the short term.

Indeed Dickinson came out fighting very soon after the announcement of the BRC’s change of heart, with talk of a ‘step up’ in their campaign over rates reform with a pronouncement that this will be a long term goal.  The obvious disconnect between those two statements didn’t seem to occur to her at the time, or as far as I know, since.

Realistic ideals

Yes it can be argued that in any negotiation there’s little point in holding out for an outcome or a deal that you’re unlikely to be able to achieve.  Asking for the impossible does make you look unreasonable and in some cases faintly ridiculous.  But a freeze was not an unrealistic ideal.  Certainly not if it was applied to retailers only.

The figure of £1Bn loss to the treasury was, it appears, a little over-egged anyway.  The true loss is predicted to be around £840M and that’s only if the freeze was applied across the board to all businesses.  Taking into account rates relief, that figure could be as low as £700M.  But I suppose a figure like £1Billion represents a powerful headline grabbing number, supporting a Treasury polemic that the BRC appears unwilling to challenge.  After all what’s a few hundred million here or there?  Not much it appears, unless you happen to be trying to get the government to reduce the rates burden by a similar amount.

Special Case

In any event, I’d argue that retail is a special case, carrying as it does multiple burdens both in duplication of the charge over multiple locations, and with deference to the amount it contributes in other ways to GDP, not least in terms of employment.  In those circumstances, if the government really wanted to help,  retail could be singled out, thus significantly reducing the overall impact of a freeze.

In fact based on last years increase of £175M, if the reduction was applied to retailers only, it would take something like 5 years before we got close to £1Bn, unless inflation moves drastically northwards.  That’s plenty of time to bring in a new and fairer form of local taxation.

Although I suppose with predictions of next year’s increase running at anything up to £300M it might not take quite so long.  Even a cap at 2% would leave us facing an uplift of around £200M showing just how little would be gained, even if that could be achieved.  Either way the point is an overhaul of the rates system should already be a government priority.  A freeze for a year might sharpen the minds and pencils of those who talk about reform without ever actually doing anything about it, and with potential rates revenue likely to continue declining as many more stores close for good, the need is becoming more urgent every day.

Helen Dickinson herself has acknowledged that :

[a freeze] “wouldn’t be enough to address the significant impact that business rates are having on local jobs, town centres and communities”

Yet somehow she seems to be arguing that a 2% increase would be a better option.  Perhaps that makes sense in some quirky, mathematically challenged, parallel universe, but until the Large Hadron Collider breaks through to a dimension where a 2% increase is better than no increase at all, we may have to file that comment under ‘S’ for Slightly Silly.

Simple ideas like adding ring-fenced increases to VAT or corporation tax might even net a greater income for the exchequer.  But perhaps there’s a hint at what lies behind the BRC’s change of heart.  Would it be outrageously cynical of me to wonder if all those large scale retailers that have the ear of the organisation have just realised that a turnover or profit based taxation system might actually cost them more?  Especially if effective action was taken to reduce tax avoidance schemes at the same time.  Just a thought.

Incredibility

From the comments I’ve received on this move so far it’s done serious damage to the credibility of the BRC, certainly with small businesses.  There’s always been a belief that as a trade body the BRC were rather more concerned with the fortunes of larger retailers, especially supermarkets, than with those of smaller independents.  This wasn’t a view I supported, but this capitulation on one of the most pressing issues on the high street will do nothing to dispel that belief.  The alignment with an institute like the CBI also pretty much puts the lid on any claims that could be made for the BRC being in touch with the grass roots retailers.  That’s all very disappointing, to put it mildly.

Happily though the Federation for Small Businesses does seem to have remained on the side of the little guys and coincidently launched their own campaign for a rates freeze on almost the same day that the BRC backed away from theirs.  I’d urge everyone to sign their petition and get involved with the campaign.

Not a negotiation

And there’s the difference that Helen Dickenson, the BRC and the CBI doesn’t seem to have noticed.  This is a campaign, not a negotiation.  We don’t need to achieve the best result we can by simply asking for what we think we’ll get.  We should be stating a position that is defensible and then fighting for it.  Yes, ridiculous expectations are a waste of energy and resources but we’re not expecting cash handouts to private businesses, jet packs or for Vince Cable to actually bother to research the difficulties that high street retailers face before he makes yet another dismissive speech.

This is a about taking a lobbying stance based on principles and fairness in the same way that campaigners have fought down the years to reform other unfair social inequalities.  Small retailers and their staff depend on the high street for a living.  In many ways reforming the inequities of an unfair taxation system is every bit as important as the fight against sex and race equality, or other socially corrosive political stances.  You can’t negotiate those values and aspirations away just try to save face and score an easy win.  Certainly not if you want to remain relevant to the people you claim to represent.

Lies, Damned Lies, and The Office For National Statistics

The ONS and I have an uneasy relationship.  When I say ‘relationship’ I probably mean something more akin to a divorcing couple waiting for a decree nisi.

Sometimes it really does feel like I’m being stalked by a disgruntled ex.  I’m sent a list of personal questions which pile up in my in-tray where I try to ignore them while getting on with my life.   Periodically I get a call to ask why we don’t talk any more.  Eventually I let out a resigned sigh and spend half an hour on the phone having a very one sided conversation with a robot voiced Welsh lady who asks me the same questions several times in a row and repeats back most of what I’ve said to her in an expressionless montone.  So pretty much like a conversation with an ex.  Apart from the fact that I never dated anyone from Wales.

I’ve been trying to get the ONS off my back for a few years now but they don’t seem to be taking the hint.  Around 10 years ago I made the mistake of religiously filing my returns as instructed like a good little citizen.  This seems to have given them the idea that I just love telling them every minute detail about my business life and, since then, with a few short breaks for good behaviour,  I’ve been on their hit list for surveys ranging from monthly takings, internet activity, employment statistics and the length of time I spend on the toilet after a particularly accomplished curry evening.  OK, I made one of those up.

Mind you, the temptation to make stuff up is almost as overwhelming as telling them to go fornicate with themselves, if it weren’t for the hollow threat of legal action if you don’t reply.  “Just bung any old numbers down” was the advice I received a few years back from someone who shall remain nameless.  But I don’t.  I actually take the time to do the calculations and give them the right figures.  Which makes it all the more irksome when I read the kinds of daft analyses that come out of the ONS on an all too regular basis.  But now it seems they’ve shown themselves to be even more irrelevant than I previously suspected.

Off the radar

This week we learnt that, after another set of Freedom of Information requests were made by fellow retail commentator Paul-Turner Mitchell, about the costs to the exchequer of the recent raft of retail failures in the UK, government officials claimed that they didn’t bother their pretty little heads with keeping up with such mundane statistics.  This admission became all the more staggering after Paul commissioned some research from Company Watch who calculated that the total cost to the UK economy since the beginning of 2012 has been in the region of £1Bn! (See Table Below).

These figures are based on the amount of unsecured debt to government that won’t be recovered.  We of course know that this isn’t the whole story.  We also need to consider the additional costs in social security payments and the knock on effects to other companies such as the loss of business to suppliers and service industries.  Although if the basic losses aren’t even being recorded, who knows if any of these implications are appearing on the exchequer’s radar.

One can only assume that the government is unconcerned about such amounts slipping down the back of the national sofa.  Although as it appears no one in the treasury or the ONS has bothered to do the sums, we can really only wonder at the basis for government rationale so far.

I’m fascinated to know what other threads of the economic tapestry they’ve allowed to be pulled apart without bothering to check the effect on the overall picture.  The effects of depressing the UK economy with successive cuts, warnings of cuts, warnings of warnings of cuts and promises of jam tomorrow seem not have been taken into account in the slightest.  Meanwhile we have government ministers such as Grant Shapps telling us that half a billion pounds being added to UK retailer’s overheads over the past two years by business rates alone is something that can’t be looked at until the deficit is dealt with.  A deficit we now know is being made worse to the tune of twice as much again by, amongst other things, these nonsensical rates increases.  Where’s the logic in saving half a billion in potential tax cuts, only to lose double than in revenue to the exchequer?

Lovable bumbler Vince Cable has more than once demonstrated his intellectual myopia over the crisis facing UK retail.  It appears now that his unshakable confidence that such a crisis doesn’t exist is based on similar logic to a five year old sticking his fingers in his ears and shouting “I CAN’T HEAR YOU!” or that old favourite adage “What you don’t know about can’t hurt you”.  Well it is hurting Vince, unless you think a billion here or there between friends isn’t worth you putting your specs on properly for.

Successive governments have been trapped in the paradox of not wanting to be seen to support private enterprise directly, yet not being able to successfully pilot the retail economy in a supportive way. But direct action is now the only option if they want to prevent the haemorrhaging of even more money from the economy.

Revolutionary

Ironic then that this news should come out in the week when everyone is discussing the bold revolutionary economic policies of Margaret Thatcher.  Right or wrong, it can’t be denied that she made drastic changes to the fabric of government in the UK.  She also wasn’t shy of making sweeping changes to policies and practices that were otherwise regarded as the way we always do things.  I’m not a Thatcherite, especially given that she was at least in part responsible for our current system of business rates, but I think now we see the folly of governments who seek to run the country using policy by proxy.  Especially when it appears that they’re almost intentionally deaf to the underlying problems within one of the principal sectors of the economy.

It’s also rather laughable that a Conservative led government is about to splash yet more millions of our hard earned tax pounds on a hoopla funereal spectacular in an attempt to ally their current lacklustre leader with the former stateswoman.  Yet more distraction and misdirection for an administration who seems only to pootle about in the outer reaches of real policy, whilst expending a great deal of energy trying very hard to look like they’re doing something stately.   We all see now that fluff initiatives like the Portas plan generated much more light than heat, and it’s likely that the new retail forum will be stymied by the same lack of political will to really tackle the problems facing retail today.

But we desperately need a bold set of initiatives to deal with the structural problems faced at all levels by the retail sector.  Not a government in denial about the impact of their own inaction.  A good start might be for them to take a few lessons in economics and try to see the macro and the micro effects that their actions and inactions are having on the overall ability of retailers to generate jobs and earnings for the country.  Perhaps cutting business rates and VAT might have little or no effect, by why don’t we find out?  What’s the worst that could happen?  Maybe another billion or so might slip through the net, but apparently the government isn’t concerned about such loose change.

So perhaps when I complete my next batch of ONS reports I may not bother working out the actual figures.  After all it seems that such information isn’t really taken that seriously by policy makers or government departments, so my going to the trouble of accurately reporting the harm their policies are doing to my business apparently isn’t informing government ministers anyway.  Maybe I’ll just add a few noughts here and there, for fun.  After all, what’s a few decimal places to a government that isn’t going to be looking anyway?

	HMRC LOSSES ON RETAIL FAILURES 2012 – 2013
					TOTAL
COMPANY	FAILURE DATE	STORES	JOBS	HMRC DEBT	UNSECURED DEBT
				£m	£m
PEACOCKS	Jan-12	550	9,600	19.1	321.0
CLINTON CARDS	May-12	767	8,500	6.7	88.3
COMET	Nov-12	243	6,500	26.2	66.0
GAME	Mar-12	600	6,000	27.3	109.6
HMV	Jan-13	238	4,350	20.7	88.8
BLOCKBUSTER	Jan-13	528	4,190	4.8	119.6
JJB SPORTS	Sep-12	180	4,000	3.0	94.9
BLACK’S LEISURE	Jan-12	306	3,885	2.9	10.8
LA SENZA	Jan-12	146	2,600	5.3	16.2
JESSOPS	Jan-13	193	2,000	1.3	45,2
DREAMS	Mar-13	171	1,675	4.6	44.0	(Note 1)
REPUBLIC	Feb-13	121	1,600	3.0	32.3	(Note 2)
PAST TIMES	Jan-12	100	1,000	2.1	10.2
MADHOUSE	Feb-12	38	700	1.6	3.4
RHYTHM & BOOZE	Apr-12	68	425	1.0	4.4	(Note 3)
ELLIE LOUISE	Apr-12	97	400	1.5	6.8
ETHEL AUSTIN	Jul-12	60	400	0.7	3.9
PUMPKIN PATCH	Jan-12	36	400	0.0	1.1
FENN WRIGHT MANSON	Mar-12	79	350	0.9	4.3
SHOON	Feb-12	23	280	1.0	2.3
TOTALS		4,544	58,855	133.7	1027.9
					(Note 4)
Note 1: Pending the Statement of Affairs, estimate based on December 2010 accounts
Note 2: Pending Statement of Affairs, estimate based on January 2012 accounts
Note 3: In absence of detailed analysis in Statement of Affairs, based on Administrators’ Proposals
Note 4: Excludes inter-group balances & bank debt